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1. Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom was one of the first countries in the world to develop formal private pension arrangements 
(beginning in the 18th Century) and was also one of the first to begin the process of reducing systematically 
unfunded state provision in favour of funded private provision (beginning in 1980).   
 
This explains why the UK is one of the few countries in Europe that is not facing a serious pensions crisis.  The 
reasons for this are straightforward: state pensions (both in terms of the replacement ratio and as a proportion of 
average earnings) are amongst the lowest in Europe, the UK has a long-standing funded private pension sector, 
its population is ageing less rapidly than elsewhere in Europe and  its governments have taken measures to 
prevent a pension crisis developing.  These measures have involved making systematic cuts in unfunded state 
pension provision and increasingly transferring the burden of providing pensions to the funded private sector. 
The UK is not entitled to be complacent, however, since there remain some serious and unresolved problems 
with the different types of private sector provision. 
 
This paper examines the key issues relating to the UK pension system.  It reviews the current system of pension 
provision, describes and analyses the reforms since 1980, examines the legal regulatory and accounting 
framework for occupational pension schemes, assesses the different types of risks and returns from membership 
of defined benefit and defined contribution pension schemes, and investigates the management and investment 
performance of pension fund assets. The paper ends with a discussion of the review of institutional investment 
in the UK conducted by Paul Myners and published in March 2001. 
 
2. The Current System of Pension Provision 
 
A flat-rate first-tier pension is provided by the state and is known as the Basic State Pension (BSP).  Second-tier 
or supplementary pensions are provided by the state, employers and private sector financial institutions, the so-
called three pillars of support in old age. The main choices are between: a state system that offers a pension that 
is low relative to average earnings but which is fully indexed to prices after retirement; an occupational system 
that offers a relatively high level of pension (partially indexed to prices after retirement up to a maximum of 5% 
p.a.), but, as a result of  poor transfer values between schemes on changing jobs, only to workers who spend 
most of their working lives with the same company; and a personal pension system that offers fully portable 
(and partially indexed) pensions, but these are based on uncertain investment returns and are subject to very high 
set-up and administration charges, often inappropriate sales tactics, and very low paid-up values if contributions 
into the plans lapse prematurely. 
 
Employees in the UK in receipt of earnings subject to National Insurance Contributions (NICs) will build up 
entitlement1 both to the BSP2 and, on ‘band earnings’ between the Lower Earnings Limit (LEL) and the Upper 
Earnings Limit (UEL)3, to the pension provided by the State Second Pension Scheme (S2P); S2P was introduced 
in April 2002 and replaced the State-Earnings-Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) which was introduced in 1978. 
These pensions are paid by the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) (formerly the Department of Social 
Security (DSS))4 from State Pension Age which is 65 for men and 60 for women5.  The self-employed are also 
entitled to a BSP, but not to a S2P pension. Employees with earnings in excess of the LEL will automatically be 
members of S2P, unless they belong to an employer’s occupational pension scheme or to a personal or 
stakeholder pension scheme that has been contracted-out of S2P.  In such cases both the individual and the 
employer contracting-out receive a rebate on their NICs (1.6% of earnings for the employee and 3.5% for the 
employer, unless it operates a COMPS in which case the employer rebate is 1.0%6) and the individual foregoes 
the right to receive a S2P pension.  However, there is no obligation on employers to operate their own pension 
scheme, nor, since 1988, is there any contractual requirement for an employee to join the employer’s scheme if 
it has one.  
 
There is a wide range of private sector pension schemes open to individuals.  They can join their employer’s 
occupational pension scheme (if it has one), which can be any one of the following: 
 
• contracted-in salary-related scheme (CISRS) 
• contracted-in money purchase scheme (CIMPS) 
• contracted-out salary-related scheme (COSRS) 
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• contracted-out money-purchase scheme (COMPS) 
• contracted-out mixed benefit scheme (COMBS) 
• contracted-out hybrid scheme (COHS). 
 
A CISRS is a defined benefit scheme that has not been contracted-out of S2P and so provides a salary-related 
pension in addition to the S2P pension.  A CIMPS provides a defined contribution supplement to the S2P 
pension. A COSRS must satisfy a ‘reference scheme test’ in order to contract out of S2P, namely provide a 
pension for life from age 65 which is indexed to inflation up to a maximum of 5% p.a. where the starting 
pension is calculated by taking a minimum of 1/80th of the average salary over the three years prior to retirement 
for each year of service in the scheme up to a maximum of 40 years service. A COMPS must have contributions 
no lower than the contracted-out rebate.  A COMBS can use a mixture of the reference scheme test and the 
minimum contributions test to contract out of S2P, while a COHS can provide pensions using a combination of 
salary-related and money purchase elements.  Individuals can also top up their schemes with Additional 
Voluntary Contributions (AVCs) or Free-Standing Additional Voluntary Contributions (FSAVCs) up to limits 
permitted by the Inland Revenue.  
 
As an alternative, individuals have the following individual pension choices that are independent of the 
employer’s scheme:  
 
• personal pension scheme (PPS)  
• group personal pension scheme (GPPS) 
• stakeholder pension scheme (SPS) 
 
A PPS is divided into two components.  The first is an Appropriate Personal Pension Scheme (APPS) which is 
contracted out of S2P and provides ‘protected rights’ benefits that stand in place of S2P benefits: they are also 
known as minimum contribution or rebate-only schemes since the only contributions permitted are the combined 
rebate on NICs with the employee’s share of the rebate grossed up for basic rate tax relief (at 22%). The second 
is an additional scheme, also contracted out,  that receives any additional contributions up to Inland Revenue 
limits.  A GPPS is a scheme that has been arranged by a small employer with only a few employees: it is 
essentially a collection of individual schemes, but with lower unit costs because of the savings on up-front 
marketing and administration costs.  A SPS is a low-cost PPS with charges capped at 1% p.a. of the fund value 
and into which contributions of up £3.600 p.a. can be made irrespective of whether the SPS member has made 
any net relevant earnings during the year7. 
 
In 1996, the UK workforce totalled 28.5 million people, of whom 3.3 million were self-employed8.  The pension 
arrangements of these people were as follows9: 
 
• 7.5 million employees in SERPS (now S2P) 
• 1.2 million employees in 110,000 contracted-in occupational schemes 
• 9.3 million employees in 40,000 contracted-out occupational schemes (85% of such schemes are 
salary-related, although 85% of new schemes started in 1998 were money purchase or hybrid) 
• 5.5 million employees in personal pension schemes  
• 1.7 million employees without a pension scheme apart from the BSP 
• 1.5 million self-employed in personal pension schemes 
• 1.8 million self-employed without a pension scheme apart from the BSP. 
 
These figures indicate that  72% of supplementary pension scheme members in 1996 were in SERPS or an 
occupational scheme and 28% were in personal pension schemes10. 
 
Table 1 shows the sources of retirement income in 1997-98. A single person had total retirement income 
averaging 43% of national average earnings.  Nearly two-thirds of this came from state benefits and another 
quarter came from occupational pensions: personal pensions provided only about 5% of total retirement income 
for the average person11. 
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3. The Reforms since 1980 
 
3.1 Thatcher-Major reforms to the pension system 
The Thatcher Conservative government that came into power in 1979 became the first government in the 
developed world to confront head on the potential crisis in state pension provision. The reforms were continued 
by the succeeding  Major government.  
 
These governments introduced the following measures: 
 
1. Linked the growth rate in state pensions to prices rather than national average earnings, thereby saving about 
2% p.a. (Social Security Act 1980). 
 
2. Raised the state pension age from 60 to 65 for women over a 10-year period beginning in 2010, thereby 
reducing the cost of state pensions by £3bn p.a. (Pensions Act 1995). 
 
3. Reduced the benefits accruing under SERPS (which had only been set up in 1978) in a number of ways: (a) 
the pension was to be reduced (over a 10-year transitional period beginning in April 1999) from 25% of  average 
revalued band earnings over the best 20 years to 20% of average revalued band  earnings over the full career 
(Social Security Act 1986); (b) the spouse’s  pension was cut from 100% of the member’s  pension to 50% from 
October 2001 (Social Security Act 1986); (c) the revaluation factor for band earnings was reduced by about 2% 
p.a. (Pensions Act 1995); the combined effect of all these changes was to reduce the value of  SERPS benefits 
by around two-thirds. 
 
4. Provided a ‘special bonus’ in the form of an extra 2% National Insurance rebate for all PPSs contracting out 
of SERPS between April 1988 and April 1993 (Social Security Act 1986); provided an incentive between April 
1993 and April 1997 in the form of a 1% age-related National Insurance rebate to members of contracted-out 
PPSs aged 30 or more to discourage them from recontracting back into SERPS; age-related National Insurance 
rebates continued in a revised form after April 1997 (Social Security Act 1993). 
 
5. Relaxed the restriction on PPSs that an annuity had to be purchased on the retirement date, by introducing an 
income drawdown facility which enabled an income (of between 35 and 100% of a single life annuity) to be 
drawn from the pension fund (which otherwise remains invested in earning assets) and delaying the obligation to 
purchase an annuity until age 75 (Finance Act 1995). 
 
6. Enabled members of occupational pension schemes to join personal pension schemes (Social Security Act 
1986). 
 
7. Simplified the arrangements for occupational schemes to contract out of SERPS by abolishing the 
requirement for occupational schemes to provide Guaranteed Minimum Pensions (GMPs): since April 1997, 
COSRSs had to demonstrate only that they satisfy the reference scheme test (Pensions Act 1995). 
 
8.  Ended its commitment to pay for part of the inflation indexation of occupational schemes (Pensions Act 
1995). Until April 1997, COSRSs had to index the GMP up to an inflation level of 3% p.a. and any additional 
pension above the GMP up to an inflation level of 5% p.a.  Since the GMP replaced the SERPS pension which 
was itself fully indexed to inflation, the government increased an individual’s state pension to compensate for 
any inflation on the GMP above 3% p.a.  But the 1995 Act abolished the GMP altogether and required COSRSs 
to index the whole of the pension that they pay up to a maximum of 5% p.a. (this is known as limited price 
indexation). 
 
9. Improved the security of the assets in private sector schemes through the creation of the Occupational 
Pensions Regulatory Authority (OPRA), a compensation fund operated by the Pension Compensation Board 
(PCB), a Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) and a Statement of Investment Principles (SIP) (Pensions Act 
1995); OPRA, the PCB and the MFR are examined in more detail below. 
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3.2. Defects in theThatcher-Major reforms 
The main defects of the Thatcher-Major reforms were as follows: 
 
1. Removing the requirement that membership of an occupational pension scheme could be made a condition of 
employment.  Membership was made voluntary and new employees had to take the active decision of joining 
their employer’s scheme: bearly more than 50% of them did so. 
 
2. No requirement to ensure that transferring from an occupational to a personal pension scheme was in the best 
interests of the employee, leading directly to the personal pensions mis-selling scandal that erupted in December 
1993. Between 1988 and 1993, 500,000 members of occupational pension schemes had transferred their assets 
to personal pension schemes following high pressure sales tactics by agents of PPS providers.  As many as 90% 
of those who transferred had been given inappropriate advice.  Miners, teachers, nurses and police officers were 
amongst the main targets of the sales agents.  Many of these people remained working for the same employer, 
but they switched from a good occupational pension scheme offering an index-linked pension into a PPS 
towards which the employer did not contribute and which took 25% of the transfer value in commissions and 
administration charges.  An example reported in the press concerned a miner who transferred to a PPS in 1989 
and retired in 1994 aged 60.  He received a lump sum of £2,576 and a pension of £734 by his new scheme.  Had 
he remained in his occupational scheme, he would have received a lump sum of £5,125 and a pension of £1,791. 
As a result of a public outcry, PPS providers have had to compensate those who had been given inappropriate 
advice to the tune of £13.5bn.  
  
3. No restriction on the charges that could be imposed in personal pension plans, hoping that market forces alone 
would ensure that PPSs were competitively provided. 
 
4. Giving personal pension scheme members the right to recontract back into SERPS.  This option has turned 
out to be extremely expensive for the government because of the back-loading of benefits in DB pension 
schemes such as SERPS: benefits accrue more heavily in the later years than the earlier years12.  Despite the 
financial incentives given to contract out of SERPS into PPSs, it turned out to be advantageous for men over 42 
and women over 34 to contract back into SERPS once the period of the special bonus had ended in 1993.  To 
discourage this from happening the government has been forced to offer additional age-related rebates to PPS 
members since 1993.  Far from saving the government money, the net cost of PPSs during the first 10 years was 
estimated by the National Audit Office to be about £10bn.  
 
 
3.3. The Blair reforms to the pension system 
The Blair New Labour government came into power in 1997 with a radical agenda for reforming the welfare 
state.  In the event, Frank Field, appointed the first Minister for Welfare Reform at the Department of Social 
Security (DSS) and charged with the objective of ‘thinking the unthinkable’, proved to be too radical for the 
traditional Old Labour wing of the Labour Party and was soon replaced.  The eventual DSS Green Paper 
proposals ‘A new contract for welfare: Partnership in pensions’ (December 1998) turned out to be much less 
radical than initially anticipated, but nevertheless continued with the Thatcher government’s agenda of  
attempting to reduce the cost to the state of public pension provision and of transferring the burden of provision 
to the private sector through the introduction of Stakeholder Pension Schemes.  Nevertheless, there was much 
greater emphasis on redistributing resources to poorer members of society than was the case with the 
Conservatives.  Shortly after the publication of the Green Paper, the Treasury issued a consultation document on 
the type of investment vehicles in which stakeholder pension contributions might be invested.  We will examine 
these proposals in turn. 
 
3.3.1 The Department of Social Security proposals 
The key objectives of the DSS Green Paper were to: 
 
1. Reduce the complexity of the UK pension system, by abolishing SERPS. 
 
2. Introduce a minimum income guarantee in retirement linked to increases in national average earnings on the 
grounds that people who work all their lives should not have to rely on means-tested benefits in retirement; the 
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first-tier BSP will remain indexed to prices, however, and over time will become a relatively unimportant 
component of most people’s pensions. 
 
3. Provide more state help for those who cannot save for retirement, eg,  the low-paid (those on less than half 
median earnings), carers and the disabled, via the unfunded state system. 
 
4. Encourage those who are able to save what they can for retirement, via affordable and secure second pillar 
pensions: 
 
• provided by the state for those on modest incomes (via a new unfunded state second pension), and  
• provided by the private sector for middle- and high-income earners, with the option of  new low-cost 
defined contribution stakeholder pensions which are likely to replace high-cost personal pensions.  
But there will be no extra compulsion to save for retirement at the second pillar and no additional 
incentives over those already existing at the second pillar.  
 
The Green Paper proposals formed the basis of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act which received the Royal 
Assent in November 1999.  The Act deals with following issues. 
 
 
3.3.1.1  State pensions 
1. A Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG) of £75 per week was introduced for pensioners in April 1999: it is 
means-tested on a weekly basis (and tapers off if the claimant’s capital exceeds a specified limit) and is indexed 
to earnings. The MIG significantly increased the benefit income of the poorest pensioners, creating a new, 
higher income threshold below which pensioners with no or little savings should not fall.  
 
2. In October 2003, the government introduced the Pension Credit (PC)13 the aim of which is not just to end the 
penalty on savings, but, for the first time, to reward savings. The PC, which is untaxed, is designed to make up 
the difference between the income a pensioner receives from all existing sources (including private pensions and 
savings) and the MIG. The PC will: 
 
• reward work and savings in retirement, by abolishing the capital limits and introducing a cash reward 
for modest savings, earnings or second-tier pensions;  
• modernise the system, by abolishing the weekly means-test, and moving more into line with the tax 
system which is based on an annual cycle, thus paving the way for further tax and benefit integration in 
the future. 
 
3. SERPS was replaced by a new State Second Pension (S2P) in April 2002: the S2P was initially earnings-
related but from April 2007 becomes a flat-rate benefit, even though contributions are earnings-related, a feature 
that is intended to provide strong incentives for middle- and  high-income earners to  contract out.  The S2P: 
 
• ensures that everyone with a complete work record receives combined pensions above the MIG 
• gives the low paid earning below £9,500 p.a. twice the SERPS pension at £9,500 p.a. (implying that 
the accrual rate is 40% of £9,500 rather than the 20% under SERPS) 
• gives a higher benefit than SERPS between £9,500 and £21,600 p.a. (average earnings in 1999)  
• leaves those earning over £21,600 p.a. unaffected (with an accrual rate of 20%) 
• uprates these thresholds in line with national average earnings 
• provides credits for carers (including parents with children under 5) and the disabled. 
 
  
3.3.1.2 Stakeholder pensions 
1. New Stakeholder Pension Schemes (SPSs) were introduced in April 2001, but are principally intended for 
middle-income earners (£9,500-£21,600) with no existing private pension provision. They can be used to 
contract out of S2P.  
 
 2. They are collective arrangements, provided by: 
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• an employer 
• a representative or membership or affinity organisation, or 
• a financial services company. 
 
3. They are defined contribution schemes, with the same restrictions as for personal pensions, namely that on the 
retirement date up to 25% of the accumulated fund may be taken as a tax-free lump sum, the remaining fund 
may be used to buy an annuity or to provide a pension income by way of a drawdown facility until age 75 when 
an annuity must be purchased with the remaining assets. 
 
4. They have to meet  minimum standards, known as CAT marks  (for charges-access-terms) concerning: 
 
• the charging structure and level of charges (a maximum of 1% of fund value) 
• levels of contractual minimum contributions (£20) 
• contribution flexibility and transferability (no penalties if contributions cease temporarily (up to 5  years) 
or if the fund is transferred to another provider). 
 
5. The main provisions of the Pensions Act 1995 apply to SPS, covering the annual report and accounts, the 
appointment of professional advisers and the Statement of Investment Principles. 
 
6. They are regulated principally by OPRA, although the selling of schemes and the supervision of their 
investment managers is regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), with the Pensions Ombudsman for 
redress. 
 
7. Employers without an occupational scheme and with at least five staff must offer access to one ‘nominated’ 
SPS and to provide a payroll deduction facility. 
 
8.  There is a new integrated tax regime for all defined contribution pension plans.  SPS, personal pension plans 
and occupational DC plans will attract tax relief on contributions up to a maximum of 17.5% of earnings (below 
age 36), rising to 40% (above age 61).  But contributions up to £3,600 pa can be made into any DC plan 
regardless of the size of net relevant earnings.  Contributions in excess of £3,600 pa may continue for up to 5 
years after relevant earnings have ceased.  Thereafter, contributions may not exceed £3,600 pa. All contributions 
into DC plans will be made net of basic rate tax, with providers recovering the tax from the Inland Revenue and 
with higher rate tax, if any, being recovered in the self-assessment tax return.   
 
 
3.3.1.3 Occupational pensions 
1. Occupational schemes can contract out of the S2P. 
 
2. Employers can again make membership of an occupational scheme a condition of employment, and 
employees are only allowed to opt out if they have signed a statement of rights being given up, certified that 
they have adequate alternative provision, and have taken advice that confirms that the alternative is at least as 
good as the S2P. 
 
3. The compensation scheme established by the 1995 Pensions Act was extended to cover 100% of the liabilities 
of pensioners and those within 10 years of  normal pension age (NPA). 
 
 
3.3.1.4 Personal pensions 
1. PPS can contract out of the S2P. 
 
2. They receive protection in cases of the bankruptcy of the member. 
 
 
3.3.2 HM Treasury proposals  
The Treasury proposals were contained in ‘Helping to Deliver Stakeholder Pensions: Flexibility in Pension 
Investment’ (February 1999).  They called for the introduction of more flexible investment vehicles for 
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